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IN THE UTAH COURT Ot APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : No. 940624-CA 
vs. : District Ct. No. 941900597 
JOE RAKES, : Category 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
COMES NOW the Appellant to the above-captioned matter 
(hereinafter "Defendant"), by and through counsel, and hereby 
submits the following as his reply brief herein: 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's brief contained inherent arguments that the trial 
court committed plain error and that exceptional circumstances 
exist in this matter. First, the trial court committed plain error 
in failing to grant Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas 
because the trial court did not engage in a specific discussion 
regarding Defendant's personal understanding of the consequences, 
and the trial court did not grant the withdrawal after Defendant 
specifically informed the court of his own misconceptions and 
explained facts supporting his position. Second, this case 
contains exceptional circumstances in that trial counsel did not 
file the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas until after the time 
limit, trial counsel did not raise nor address the ineffective 
assistance issue, trial counsel then filed the appeal in this 
1 
matter, and conflict counsel was not appointed until after the 
appeal had been filed• 
Defendant's brief also established that Defendant was 
prejudiced due to trial counsel's performance. Defendant asserted 
trial counsel's actions or failure to act led him to plead guilty 
when he would not have otherwise done so. Additionally, trial 
counsel's inherent conflict significantly prejudiced Defendant's 
case. 
Finally, Defendant has been required to rely on facts not 
fully set forth in the record because important facts regarding 
trial counsel's ineffective performance were not in the record due 
to the unusual procedural nature of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
L. DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF HIS 
GUILTY PLEAS CONTAINED INHERENT ARGUMENTS THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AND THAT EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST IN THIS MATTER. 
Although Defendant did not specifically assert that the trial 
court committed plain error in refusing to allow Defendant to 
withdraw his guilty pleas and further did not specifically assert 
the existence of exceptional circumstances, Defendant's argument is 
replete with arguments inherently asserting these positions. The 
standard has been set forth as follows: 
"As a general rule, "a defendant who fails to bring an 
issue before the trial court is barred from asserting it 
initially on appeal." State v. Johnson, 774 P. 2d 1141, 
1144 (Utah 1989). However, an appellate court may 
address an issue for the first time on appeal if: "(1) 
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the trial court committed 'plain error,' or (2) there 
are 'exceptional circumstances.'"" 
State v. Pricef 837 P.2d 578, 580-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Although the standard was not specifically mentioned within 
Defendant's brief, Defendant's arguments within the brief show that 
the standard has been met in this case. 
First, the trial court committed plain error in failing to 
grant Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. As stated 
in Defendant's brief, the trial court did not engage in a specific 
discussion regarding the Defendant's own understanding of the 
consequences of entering the guilty pleas. (Appellant's Brief, p. 
14). The trial court merely asked Defendant whether he had entered 
the pleas voluntarily. The trial court did not ask Defendant to 
explain his position nor to explain, in his own words, what he 
believed to be the elements of or the factual basis for crimes that 
he had committed and to which he was pleading guilty. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 13-14). Later, at the hearing on Defendant's motion to 
withdraw the guilty pleas, Defendant informed the court that he was 
under the impression that he was not bound to his guilty pleas if 
he withdrew the same within thirty days. (R. 142-145). Defendant 
further explained that he thought that by entering the pleas he 
would have thirty days within which to speak to potential witnesses 
about testifying at trial. (R. 142). Defendant also explained 
that he thought that by entering the pleas he would have the time 
and opportunity to obtain a specific drug test on the evidence 
which may have shown that the substance in his possession was not 
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methamphetamine. (R. 163). 
In addition, at the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, 
Defendant also informed the court that the substance which as in 
his possession at the time he was arrested was not actually 
methamphetamine. (R. 163). Defendant explained to the court that 
the substance was a white powder that he had purchased legally at 
a local gasoline station. (R. 144). Defendant also informed the 
court that he had spoken to a representative of the pharmacology 
department at the University of Utah who had informed him of the 
possibility of receiving a false positive test on a substance very 
similar to methamphetamine. (R. 144-145). Defendant told the 
court that the pharmacology department representative had explained 
that the false positive test could occur on both police field tests 
and state crime lab tests. (R. 157). Defendant informed the court 
that the pharmacology department representative had indicated a 
willingness and readiness to perform a test which could prove 
whether or not a false positive had resulted in this action. (R. 
148) . 
As argued in Defendant7s brief, the facts set forth above show 
that Defendant entered into the plea unknowingly, unintelligently, 
and inadvisedly. Further, at the hearing on Defendant's motion, 
Defendant set forth sufficient facts, as set forth above, to 
indicate that there was not a factual basis for the plea. 
Defendant's brief also explained the standard set forth by the 
Utah Supreme Court with regard to the withdrawal of guilty pleas. 
11
 [A] presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in 
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general, be liberally granted.11 State v. Gallegos, 738 P. 2d 1040, 
1042 (Utah 1987). Even though the motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea was filed a few days after the time limit, the motion was 
filed and heard prior to sentencing and, pursuant to the 
circumstances of this case, should have been granted. 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion and 
committed plain error in refusing to grant Defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas in this matter. 
Second, exceptional circumstances exist in this matter as 
follows: (1) trial counsel did not file the motion to withdraw 
the guilty pleas until after the thirty-day time limit, (2) trial 
counsel did not raise nor address issues of ineffective assistance 
or error at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, 
(3) trial counsel filed the appeal in this matter, and (4) 
conflict counsel was not appointed until after the appeal had been 
filed. Trial counsel's errors during the time periods of both the 
entry of the pleas and the motion for withdrawal are a significant 
portion of the basis of this appeal. Due to the fact that trial 
counsel represented Defendant until a point after the appeal had 
been filed, Defendant necessarily could not reasonably have raised 
issues concerning trial counsel's errors and ineffectiveness until 
this appeal. 
In fact, this court has stated that "[w]hile ordinarily a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be addressed by 
collateral attack through habeas corpus proceedings, in limited 
circumstances, the claim may be raised on direct appeal . . . Those 
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circumstances exist when there is new counsel on appeal and there 
is an adequate trial record." State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d 484, 487 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) citing State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 
(Utah 1991); United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1072 (9th 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Tatum. 943 F.2d 370, 380 (4th Cir. 
1991); Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133-34 
(3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis added) (holding that because there was new 
counsel on appeal and an adequate trial record existed, the 
circumstances were exceptional and therefore the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was considered as first raised on 
appeal). 
II. DEFENDANT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT HE HAS BEEN 
PREJUDICED DUE TO TRIAL COUNSEL/S PERFORMANCE IN THIS 
MATTER. 
In it's brief, the State has asserted that Defendant has 
relied on mere speculation to establish trial counsel's ineffective 
assistance in this matter. (State's brief, p. 11). However, 
Defendant asserted specific instances of trial counsel's action 
and, alternatively, failure to act which constituted 
ineffectiveness and resulted in prejudice to Defendant. (See 
Defendant's brief, pp. 18-19). The State further relies on State 
v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), for the rule that 
defendant must establish, on the record, both the identification of 
specific acts or omissions that fell below the standard of 
reasonableness and that he would not have pleaded guilty but for 
counsel's error. However, the State's reliance on this case is 
misplaced. Within Ellifritz, this Court merely stated that lf[w]hen 
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the question of trial counsel ineffectiveness is raised for the 
first time on appeal and our review is confined to the trial court 
record, we determine, as a matter of law, whether defense counsel's 
performance constituted ineffective counsel." Id. at 175 (emphasis 
added). 
The State further claims that Defendant did not argue, "let 
alone establish[], how any of trial counsel's acts or omissions led 
him to plead guilty when he would not have otherwise." (State's 
brief, p. 11). However, Defendant's brief clearly indicated that 
Defendant would not have plead guilty had trial counsel advised him 
as to the nature and elements of the crime to which Defendant was 
pleading guilty, or informed Defendant that the entry of a guilty 
plea was a final disposition of the matter and would only be 
withdrawn for good cause. (Defendant's brief, p. 18). Defendant's 
brief also indicated that Defendant would not have plead guilty had 
trial counsel not led him to believe that he should plead guilty 
because he would not be able to obtain witnesses to testify on his 
behalf at trial. (Defendant's brief, p. 18). 
Furthermore, the State claims in its brief that the record 
contains no facts to overcome the presumption that trial counsel 
represented defendant competently, specifically asserting that the 
record does not show that Defendant contested that he did not 
intentionally attempt to possess the counterfeit methamphetamine. 
However, as cited in Defendant's brief, Defendant specifically 
informed the trial court that he did not intentionally attempt to 
possess a counterfeit methamphetamine and moreover, Defendant 
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specifically stated that the substance which he possessed was not 
methamphetamine. (R. 144, 163). Accordingly, the record contains 
Defendant's specific assertion that he did not intentionally 
attempt to possess methamphetamine because the substance in his 
possession was a legally purchased product. It is nonsensical to 
assert that Defendant intentionally attempted to possess 
methamphetamine when he specifically asserts his knowledge that the 
substance was not methamphetamine. 
The State also argues that trial counsel's failure to argue 
the absence of a separately stated intent element at the hearing on 
the motion to withdraw guilty pleas did not constitute deficiency 
because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion. 
This argument is circular, however, because it was trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness (failure to act in filing the motion to withdraw 
guilty pleas within the jurisdictional time limits) which caused 
the court to find it lacked jurisdiction in the first place. 
Finally, the State argues that Defendant did not set forth 
independent authority for the assertion that trial counsel had a 
conflict with Defendant at the hearing on the motion to withdraw 
the guilty pleas due to a natural reluctance to admit prior 
deficiencies and that therefore this Court need not reach the 
merits of the claim. Defendant had previously considered the 
conflict engendered by trial counsel's position at the withdrawal 
of plea hearing obvious and therefore did not set forth specific 
authority relating similar circumstances. However, authority 
regarding ineffective assistance was presented in Defendant's 
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brief. 
The circumstances in this matter are similar to those in State 
v, Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Johnson was cited 
in the State's brief as controlling case law. In Johnson, this 
Court stated as follows: 
"[A] sixth amendment claim grounded on conflict of 
interest is a special subtype of an ineffectiveness 
claim" and must be analyzed under the following standard, 
which is different than that used for other ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims . . . A defendant who did 
not object to the conflict at trial has the burden on 
appeal of demonstrating with specificity that "an actual 
conflict of interest existed which adversely affected his 
[or her] lawyer's performance" . . . If the defendant 
makes such a showing, prejudice need not be demonstrated 
to prevail on the claim . . . The court will presume the 
defendant was prejudiced by the lawyer's performance. 
JohnsonP at 488 (citations omitted). Johnson was the first Utah 
case in which the conflict of interest was between the lawyer and 
the client, as is the circumstance in this case. Johnson analyzed 
the conflict of interest between lawyer and client in light of 
ethical standards under the Rules of Professional Conduct, relying 
on Government of Virgin Islands v. Zeppr 748 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 
1984) and United States v. Hobson. 672 F.2d 825 (11th Cir. 1982). 
Rule 1.7(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states 
that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation 
of that client may be materially limited by . . . the lawyer's own 
interest, unless: (1) The lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) Each client 
consents after consultation." Also, "in order to continue 
representation under Rule 1.7(b), the client's representation must 
nQt appear to be adversely affected by the lawyer's other 
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interests." Johnson , at 489, citing Code comparison, Utah 
R.Prof.Conduct 1.7. Further, where the "probity of a lawyer's own 
conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be 
difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached 
advice." Comment, Utah R.Prof.Conduct 1.7. 
In this matter, trial counsel's representation of Defendant 
prior to and during the motion to withdraw the guilty plea 
presented a conflict with her own interests. Trial counsel had a 
responsibility to represent Defendant zealously, setting forth all 
possible relevant arguments. However, trial counsel also had a 
conflicting self-interest of not setting forth arguments which 
assert her own ineffectiveness. This conflict resulted in serious 
prejudice to Defendant's case and resulted in denial of Defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. In Johnson, this Court held 
that the attorney "had a personal interest in vindicating himself 
which was not consonant with the interests of his client." Id. at 
490. The attorney in Johnson had been implicated as a co-
conspirator through witness testimony and closing argument at 
trial. This case is not similar to Johnson in the specific 
circumstances of the conflict between counsel and client, but the 
prejudicial result is the same. Accordingly, trial counsel's 
inherent conflict of interest at the hearing on plea withdrawal 
resulted in prejudice to Defendant's case and therefore the trial 
court's denial of Defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea should 
be overturned. 
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Ill, DEFENDANT MUST. OF NECESSITY. RELY ON FACTS NOT 
FULLY SET FORTH IN THE RECORD DUE TO THE EXCEPTIONAL 
NATURE OF THIS CASE. 
The State's brief is fraught with statements that Defendant 
has failed to rely on the record to further his arguments. 
However, a great portion of Defendant's arguments are based on 
errors made by Defendant's trial counsel. These errors consist of 
trial counsel's advice to Defendant and Defendant's requests to 
trial counsel throughout the plea process. These errors also 
consist of trial counsel's failure to file the motion to withdraw 
guilty pleas within the thirty-day time period. Conversations 
between counsel and client are certainly not normally part of the 
record on appeal. 
Significantly, trial counsel filed the appeal in this matter. 
At that time, the record was prepared and transmitted to the Court 
of Appeals. It was not until after this time that trial counsel 
withdrew as a result of the inherent conflict in this case. This 
inherent conflict was due to the fact that trial counsel cannot 
reasonably argue his or her own ineffectiveness on appeal. 
Conflict counsel was appointed. However, since the appeal had 
already been filed without a previous opportunity to assert trial 
counsel's ineffectiveness, Defendant's only alternative consisted 
of filing a motion for remand pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Defendant has done so, and has 
renewed his motion after the initial denial. It has been denied 
twice. Had the motion been granted, Defendant would have had an 
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opportunity to supplement the record with specific testimony 
concerning trial counsel's ineffectiveness. This Court 
nevertheless denied Defendant's motion for remand. Accordingly, 
Defendant cannot cite to any record with regard to specific 
allegations of misconduct by trial counsel, other than his 
affidavit before this Court in support of his Rule 23B motion. 
Defendant should not be denied the opportunity to make such 
important arguments. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide 
exceptions to the reguirement of citation to the record in other 
circumstances. For example, parties may prepare and sign a 
statement of the case, approved by the trial court, in lieu of 
citing to the record on appeal. Utah R. App. P. 11 (e). Further, 
appellants may prepare a statement of evidence or proceedings when 
no report was made or when the transcript is unavailable. Utah R. 
App. P. 11 (f). Finally, corrections and/or modifications to the 
record may be made upon motion of either party or by the trial 
court, sua sponte. Utah R. App. P. 11 (h). 
Although the specific exceptions enumerated in the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure are not expressly applicable in this case, 
this court should carry out the intent of such exceptions in 
providing the ability to set forth facts not contained in the 
record of the trial court under limited circumstances. This is 
such an exceptional, limited circumstance. The court should 
consider Defendant's affidavit. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial 
court. The Court should set aside Defendant's guilty pleas and 
should remand this matter for trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this day of February, 1996. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
MARY C. CORPORON iS>£r "???[ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellee 
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